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### 1

#### Will pass – top Democrats.

Reuters 2-3. ["Reid predicts Congress will pass immigration legislation" -- news.yahoo.com/reid-predicts-u-congress-pass-immigration-legislation-172812947.html]

The top Senate Democrat on Sunday predicted that Congress will pass and send to President Barack Obama legislation overhauling the U.S. immigration system, saying "things are looking really good."¶ Obama last week expressed hope Congress can get a deal done on immigration, possibly in the first half of the year.¶ The president is proposing to give the roughly 11 million U.S. illegal immigrants - most of whom are Hispanics - a pathway to citizenship, a step that many Republicans have long fought.¶ Obama's fellow Democrats control the Senate, but Republicans control the House of Representatives.¶ Appearing on the ABC program "This Week," Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid was asked whether immigration legislation can win House passage.¶ "Well, it's certainly going to pass the Senate. And it would be a bad day for our country and a bad day for the Republican Party if they continue standing in the way of this. So the answer is yes," Reid said.¶ Obama choose Reid's home state of Nevada, with a sizable Hispanic population, as the site for a major speech last Tuesday pushing Congress to pass an immigration bill.¶ Hispanic voters were crucial in helping Obama beat Republican nominee Mitt Romney - who advocated "self-deportation" of illegal immigrants - in Nevada in November.¶ "It has to get done," Reid said of immigration legislation.¶ "It's really easy to write principles. To write legislation is much harder. And once we write the legislation, then you have to get it passed. But I think things are looking really good," Reid added.¶ After years on the back burner, immigration reform has suddenly looked possible as Republicans, chastened by the fact that more than 70 percent of Hispanic voters backed Obama in the November election, appear more willing to accept an overhaul.

#### PC key to get immigration compromise,

Hollander 1-21. [Catherine, reporter, "4 Ways Obama Could Boost Economy in His 2nd Term" National Journal -- www.nationaljournal.com/whitehouse/4-ways-obama-could-boost-economy-in-his-2nd-term-20130121]

3. Pass immigration reform. Obama has made clear that immigration reform is a top priority for his second term. A bipartisan group of senators has been working to draft a bill to overhaul the nation's immigration laws. The issue is teed up for the 113th Congress. On Sunday, top White House adviser David Plouffe said there was “no reason” immigration reform shouldn’t move through Congress this year. Still, passing legislation will be no easy feat. Republicans want to take up immigration initiatives piecemeal, while Obama is calling for comprehensive legislation.¶ If Congress can reach agreement on immigration policy, it could help the economy. “Comprehensive immigration reform that legalizes currently unauthorized immigrants and creates flexible legal limits on future immigration in the context of full labor rights would help American workers and the U.S. economy,” Raúl Hinojosa-Ojeda of the University of California-Los Angeles, wrote in the Cato Journal last winter. More recently, Kevin Hassett of the conservative American Enterprise Institute argued that a “vast expansion of legal immigration could feed the next economic boom.”

#### Nuclear power costs political capital – risks, startup cost, and public safety

Trembath 2/4/11 (Alex, Policy Fellow in AEL’s New Energy Leaders Project, “Nuclear Power and the Future of Post-Partisan Energy Policy”) <http://leadenergy.org/2011/02/the-nuclear-option-in-a-post-partisan-approach-on-energy/>

If there is one field of the energy sector for which certainty of political will and government policy is essential, it is nuclear power. High up front costs for the private industry, extreme regulatory oversight and public wariness necessitate a committed government partner for private firms investing in nuclear technology. In a new [report](http://www.thirdway.org/publications/370) on the potential for a “nuclear renaissance,” Third Way references the failed cap-and-trade bill, delaying tactics in the House vis-a-vis EPA regulations on CO₂, and the recent election results to emphasize the difficult current political environment for advancing new nuclear policy. The report, “The Future of Nuclear Energy,” makes the case for political certainty:

#### CIR is key to the economy – capital injection, work force, tax base

Ojeda 12 (Raul Hinojosa, “The Economic Benefits of Comprehensive Immigration Reform”) http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/cato-journal/2012/1/cj32n1-12.pdf

The results of our modeling suggest that comprehensive immigration reform would increase U.S. GDP by at least 0.84 percent per year. Using 10-year GDP projections prepared by the Congressional Budget Office, this translates into a steadily increasing amount of added annual GDP over the coming decade. The 10-year total is at least $1.5 trillion in added GDP, which includes roughly $1.2 trillion in additional consumption and $256 billion in additional investment. Comprehensive immigration reform brings substantial economic gains even in the short run—during the first three years following legalization. The real wages of newly legalized workers increase by roughly $4,400 per year among those in less-skilled jobs during the first three years of implementation, and $6,185 per year for those in higher-skilled jobs. The higher earning power of newly legalized workers translates into an increase in net personal income of $30 billion to $36 billion, which would generate $4.5 to $5.4 billion in additional net tax revenue nationally, enough to support 750,000 to 900,000 new jobs.

**Economic downturn causes great power wars and extinction.**

**AUSLIN ‘9** - scholar at American Enterprise Institute (Michael, “The global Economy Unravels” American Enterprise Institute, <http://www.aei.org/publications/filter.all,pubID.29502/pub_detail.asp>)

What do these trends mean in the short and medium term? The Great Depression showed how social and global chaos followed hard on economic collapse. The mere fact that parliaments across the globe, from America to Japan, are unable to make responsible, economically sound recovery plans suggests that they do not know what to do and are simply hoping for the least disruption. Equally worrisome is the adoption of more statist economic programs around the globe, and the concurrent decline of trust in free-market systems. The threat of instability is a pressing concern. China, until last year the world's fastest growing economy, just reported that 20 million migrant laborers lost their jobs. Even in the flush times of recent years, China faced upward of 70,000 labor uprisings a year. A sustained downturn poses grave and possibly immediate threats to Chinese internal stability. The regime in Beijing may be faced with a choice of repressing its own people or diverting their energies outward, leading to conflict with China's neighbors. Russia, an oil state completely dependent on energy sales, has had to put down riots in its Far East as well as in downtown Moscow. Vladimir Putin's rule has been predicated on squeezing civil liberties while providing economic largesse. If that devil's bargain falls apart, then wide-scale repression inside Russia, along with a continuing threatening posture toward Russia's neighbors, is likely. **Even** apparently **stable societies** face increasing risk and the threat of internal or possibly external conflict. As Japan's exports have plummeted by nearly 50%, one-third of the country's prefectures have passed emergency economic stabilization plans. Hundreds of thousands of temporary employees hired during the first part of this decade are being laid off. Spain's unemployment rate is expected to climb to nearly 20% by the end of 2010; Spanish unions are already protesting the lack of jobs, and the specter of violence, as occurred in the 1980s, is haunting the country. Meanwhile, in Greece, workers have already taken to the streets. Europe as a whole will face dangerously increasing tensions between native citizens and immigrants, largely from poorer Muslim nations, who have increased the labor pool in the past several decades. Spain has absorbed five million immigrants since 1999, while nearly 9% of Germany's residents have foreign citizenship, including almost 2 million Turks. The xenophobic labor strikes in the U.K. do not bode well for the rest of Europe. A prolonged global downturn, let alone a collapse, would dramatically raise tensions inside these countries. Couple that with possible protectionist legislation in the United States, unresolved ethnic and territorial disputes in all regions of the globe and a loss of confidence that world leaders actually know what they are doing. The result may be a series of small explosions that **coalesce into a big bang**

### 2

**Their use of security Security is articulated through gendered binaries—that requires domination and elimination of those who threaten the dominant masculine body politic**

**Wilcox 3** [Lauren, PhD in IR @ University of Minnesota, BA @ Macalester College, MA @ London School of Economics, “Security Masculinity: The Gender-Security Nexus”, RCB]

**Post-structuralists emphasize not only the discursive process of securitization, but the ways in which issues of identity factor into this process**. ”Practicing security‘ entails specific state actions not just in external policies, but in internal politics as well. **By labeling external threats, the state constructs** a regime of **identity by demarcating who and what is to be feared by ”us.‘** ”Security‘ implies not only specific actions, but specific implications for the identity of what is being ”secured‘. David Campbell argues in Writing Security: American Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity, that security is the raison d‘être of the state. He further notes hat—the state requires discourses of ”danger‘ to provide a new theology about who and what ”we‘ are by highlighting who or what ”we‘ are not, and what ”we‘ have to fear.“10 Thus, the process **of ”securitizing‘ can also be a process to define a nation‘s identity by drawing boundaries between who and what is acceptable** (on the ”inside‘) **and what is unacceptable** (on the ”outside‘). **”Security‘ is implicated in the production of dichotomies that structure** the discipline and the way we think about **international relations, such as inside/outside, self/other, us/them and sovereignty/anarchy. Much of this** type of language **was used in reference to terrorist and immigration, including the** creation of a **hierarchy between ”us‘ and ”them**,‘ the criminalization and militarized responses, fears of internal subversion, **and the discursive location of threats being outside the territory of the US**.My understanding of ”security‘ and ”gender‘ is rooted in feminist contributions to international relations and security studies as well. Feminist scholarship informs my work in many ways, as feminist theorists, like critical theorists, attempt to, —make strange what has previously appeared familiar [and] to challenge us to question what has hitherto appeared as ”natural.‘ “11 Of key importance to this specific study are feminist scholars of IR who take the post-structuralist analysis further, and note how the dichotomies that constitute the field of international relations are so readily ”mapped onto‘ gender. Feminist scholar Charlotte Hooper‘s analysis of the gendered nature of the field of international relations is similar to Campbell‘s, noting how **dichotomies such as active/passive, war/peace, and order/anarchy are assigned masculine and feminine traits**, with the first being valued over the second. This use of the concept of gender is consistent with how ”gender‘ is used in this paper. The insights feminist post-structuralists provide into the gendered nature of the process of drawing borders between ”us‘ and ”them‘ and ”domestic‘ and ”foreign‘ are particularly relevant in the context of my research into the securitization of immigration and terrorism, as the discourses used in this context have clearly made these distinctions. They are also gendered **discourses**, as they **rely on gendered dichotomies**. My analysis of the gendered discourses of terrorism and immigration is based on this type of post-structuralist feminist analysis.Because of the prevalence of gendered dichotomies in IR and their role in constructing identities and boundaries, the practice of international relations and **”security‘ is inextricably linked to identity formation**. Feminist scholars of **international relations have noted the** extensive **association of masculinity and war**, and have analyzed how war and IR and masculinities have been mutually constructed though military service, 12 and by several different kinds of ”hegemonic masculinities‘ that serve as the prototypical behavior for men indifferent contexts.13**When writing of ”gender,‘ I want to make clear I do not equate this term to ”men and women‘** (or just women for that matter) but, as a system of asymmetrical social constructs of masculinity and femininity.14 While employing a gender analysis of issues such as militarization, war, and terrorism, **I will not be addressing such issues as whether or not men or women are inherently violent or peaceful**, or, in response to Francis Fukuyama, what would happen if women were our political leaders.15 **Rather, I use to concept of gender as a symbolic system organizes many cultural discourses, and is mapped on to certain dichotomies, such as hard/soft, inside/outside, sovereignty/anarchy, active/passive**, as I briefly explained above. As gender is a normative system in which the concept associated with masculinity in the dichotomy is considered more desirable, gender in International Relations also serves as a prescriptive formulation. This is not say that actual men and women are irrelevant to gender, but that **gender as a discursive system represents men and women differently, and constructs different social spaces and functions for them. Race, class, and other variables are also part of a gender discourse that represents a feminine ”other‘ that deviates from the masculine ”norm‘. The concept of ”hegemonic masculinity‘ is also related to the concept of gender**. This term, which is discussed at length in chapter three, indicates the prevailing definition of masculinity, driven by social and political trends and defined against subordinate masculinities, such as racial minorities and non-heterosexual orientations.

**The impact is Extinction**

**Warren and Cady 94**—Warren is the Chair of the Philosophy Department at Macalester College and Cady is Professor of Philosophy at Hamline University (Karen and Duane, “Feminism and Peace: Seeing Connections”, p. 16, JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3810167.pdf)

Operationalized, the evidence of patriarchy as a dysfunctional system is found in the behaviors to which it gives rise, (c), and the unmanageability, (d), which results. For example, in the United States, current estimates are that one out of every three or four women will be raped by someone she knows; globally, rape, sexual harassment, spouse-beating, and sado-masochistic pornography are examples of behaviors practiced, sanctioned, or tolerated within patriarchy. In the realm of environmentally destructive behaviors, strip-mining, factory farming, and pollution of the air, water, and soil are instances of behaviors maintained and sanctioned within patriarchy. They, too, rest on the faulty beliefs that it is okay to "rape the earth," that it is "man's God-given right" to have dominion (that is, domination) over the earth, that nature has only instrumental value, that environmental destruction is the acceptable price we pay for "progress."And the presumption of warism, that war is a natural, righteous, and ordinary way to impose dominion on a people or nation, goes hand in hand with patriarchy and leads to dysfunctional behaviors of nations and ultimately to international unmanageability. Much of the current" unmanageability" of contemporary life in patriarchal societies, (d), is then viewed as a consequence of a patriarchal preoccupation with activities, events, and experiences that reflect historically male-gender identified beliefs, values, attitudes, and assumptions. Included among these real-life consequences are precisely those concerns with **nuclear proliferation, war, environmental destruction, and violence toward women**, which many feminists see as the logical outgrowth of patriarchal thinking. In fact, it is often only through observing these dysfunctional behaviors-the symptoms of dysfunctionality that one can truly see that and how patriarchy serves to maintain and perpetuate them. When patriarchy is understood as a dysfunctional system, this "unmanageability" can be seen for what it is-as a predictable and thus logical consequence of patriarchy.'1 The theme that global environmental crises, war, and violence generally are predictable and logical consequences of sexism and patriarchal culture is pervasive in ecofeminist literature (see Russell 1989, 2). Ecofeminist Charlene Spretnak, for instance, argues that "militarism and warfare are continual features of a patriarchal society because they reflect and instill patriarchal values and fulfill needs of such a system. Acknowledging the context of patriarchal conceptualizations that feed militarism is a first step toward reducing their impact and preserving life on Earth" (Spretnak 1989, 54). Stated in terms of the foregoing model of patriarchy as a dysfunctional social system, the claims by Spretnak and other feminists take on a clearer meaning: Patriarchal conceptual frameworks legitimate impaired thinking (about women, national and regional conflict, the environment) which is manifested in behaviors which, if continued, **will make life on earth difficult, if not impossible**. It is a stark message, but it is plausible. Its plausibility lies in understanding the conceptual roots of various woman-nature-peace connections in regional, national, and global contexts.

**Vote neg to reject the hegemonic masculinity inherent in the ideational process of the 1AC**

**Beland 2009**

Daniel Beland. “Gender, Ideational Analysis, and Social Policy” Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State and Society. Vol 16 Num 4. Pp 558-581. Winter 2009

To further illustrate the role of frames in politics and policy change, let me discuss three ways in which political actors can mobilize them. First, **frames can take the form of a public discourse used by speciﬁc political actors to convince others that policy change is necessary.** This is what political scientist Robert H. Cox (2001) calls “the social construction of the need to reform” and what politi- cal philosopher Nancy Fraser (1989) has called the “politics of needs interpretation.” From this perspective, **discursive frames can help convince political actors and the general public that existing policy legacies are ﬂawed, and that reforms should be enacted to solve perceived social and economic problems.** Thus, **policy learning can feed framing processes in the sense that experts, ofﬁcials, and interest groups can publicly voice their negative assessments of exist- ing policies to convince other actors that the time has come to improve or even replace them.** But “social learning remains analyti- cally distinct from framing activities in part because learning can occur without the emergence of a public discourse about the need to reform. An autonomous set of evaluative activities, social learning generally predates and, in only some cases, informs framing pro- cesses” (Be´ land 2006, 562). Overall, **discursive frames help actors make a case for policy change, and this activity generally involves a public discussion of the meaning and performance of existing policy legacies.** Second, **these frames help political actors convince other groups and individuals to form a coalition around a concrete proposal or vision for change.** As discussed above, ideational processes partici- pate in the construction of interests and the ranking of policy goals. In this context, **particular political actors can use frames and politi- cal discourse to inﬂuence the way other actors see their interests and identify with shared policy goals.** From this perspective, **policy debates are largely about the construction of interests, policy goals, and identities, without which political coalitions can hardly survive.** Although concrete quid pro quos between key political actors are a major aspect of coalition building (Bonoli 2000), **frames can help sell concrete policy alternatives to the public and build a stronger coalition around them.** On one hand, politicians can “speak to their base” and argue that the measures they support are consistent with the broad ideological principles that cement their existing coalition. On the other hand, ambiguous policy ideas and proposals can make many different actors believe that they have an interest in supporting a complex policy alternative, which can lead to seemingly paradoxi- cal coalitions (Palier 2005). Third, political actors can mobilize framing processes to counter criticism targeting the policy alternatives they support. Thus, one might expand Weaver’s notion of blame avoidance strategies (Weaver 1986) to take on a discursive form. For instance, ofﬁcials may blame economic cycles for higher unemployment rates to con- vince the public that their decisions are not at the origin of this negative situation. **Policymakers can also frame policy alternatives in a way that diverts attention away from their actual departure from well-accepted political symbols or policy paradigms.** For example, since the 1980s, Swedish politicians have referred to enduringly popular idea of “social democracy” to legitimize forms of policy change that are arguably closer to neoliberalism than to traditional social democratic ideals (Cox 2004). Blame avoidance frames such as these have a preventive component because political actors use them to shield the policy alternatives they support from criticism (Be´ land 2005, 11). **Scholars interested in the gender – social policy nexus have long analyzed discursive and framing processes** (Tannen 1994), and their potential impact on policy change (Lewis 2002). A good example of this type of scholarship is the research of Hobson and Lindholm (1997) on the mobilization of Swedish women during the 1930s. In order to understand this mobilization, the authors bridge the power resource approach and the sociological scholarship on social movements. **Their analysis of women’s mobilization emphasizes the role of what they call “discursive resources,” a concept that “acknowledges that social groups engage in struggles over the mean- ings and the boundaries of political and social citizenship. This includes the cultural narratives and metaphors that social actors exploit in their public representations as well as the contesting ideological stances that they take on dominant themes and issues on the political agenda.”** (Hobson and Lindholm 1997, 479) For these two scholars, **ideational processes clearly serve as powerful framing tools in struggles over gender and social policy change.** Once again, **this discussion of the gender scholarship points to the relationship between ideational processes and categorical inequalities, a major issue that is frequently overlooked in the general ideational literature on policy and politics. By pointing to this key relationship, students of gender and social policy make a strong and original contribution to this ideational literature.**

### 3

### Solvency

**Nuclear power production at low levels**

**Bloomsberg 1/22/13** - *Nuclear Output Falls to 22-Day Low as Two Reactors Shut,* http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-01-22/nuclear-output-falls-to-22-day-low-as-two-reactors-shut.html

U.S. nuclear-power generation fell to the lowest level in three weeks as reactors shut in Louisiana and [Ohio](http://topics.bloomberg.com/ohio/). Output dropped 2.5 percent to [90,979 megawatts](http://www.bloomberg.com/quote/NRC1TOTL:IND), or 89 percent of capacity, the least since Dec. 31, according to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission data compiled by Bloomberg. Production was [3.2 percent](http://www.bloomberg.com/quote/NRC1TOTL:IND) below a year ago, with 10 of 104 reactors offline. [Entergy Corp. (ETR)](http://www.bloomberg.com/quote/ETR:US) shut the 1,250-megawatt Waterford 3 reactor, which operated at 85 percent of capacity yesterday, according to a filing with the commission. The plant, about 25 miles (40 kilometers) west of New Orleans, automatically tripped offline after one of the steam generators reached a “low level condition,” the filing showed. “The cause is still under investigation but initial indications are that we had a problem with one of the feedwater pumps,” Carl Rhode, a company spokesman based at the plant, said in an e-mail. Feedwater pumps supply water to steam generators. The Waterford unit went online last week for the first time in three months after Entergy replaced two steam generators, a reactor vessel head and a coolant pump. Perry Trip The 1,261-megawatt Perry 1 plant operated by [FirstEnergy Corp. (FE)](http://www.bloomberg.com/quote/FE:US) tripped offline early today. The unit, 35 miles northeast of [Cleveland](http://topics.bloomberg.com/cleveland/), was at full power until its water level began to drop, Jennifer Young, a company spokeswoman based in Akron, Ohio, said in an e-mail. The levels have been restored to normal, she said. “The plant will remain shut down until the issue is fully understood and resolved,” Young said. Reactor maintenance shutdowns, usually undertaken in the U.S. spring or fall when energy use is lowest, may increase consumption of natural gas and coal to generate electricity. The average refueling down time was 43 days in 2011, according to the [Nuclear Energy Institute](http://topics.bloomberg.com/nuclear-energy-institute/).

1. **Global PR campaign shutting down nuclear power now – causing transition to renewables – stopping extinction from meltdowns**

**Wasserman 12**

(Harvery, American journalist, author, democracy activist, and advocate for renewable energy. He has been a strategist and organizer in the anti-nuclear movement in the United States for over 30 years., 'SOLARTOPIA! Our Green-Powered Earth' http://www.huffingtonpost.com/harvey-wasserman/post\_3127\_b\_1353253.html)

In the wake of Fukushima, grassroots citizen action is shutting the worldwide nuclear power industry. A Solartopian tipping point is upon us in the U.S., Europe and Japan which will re-define how the human race gets its energy. States rights and local democracy are at the core of the battle. The definitive breaking point looms in Vermont. By mid-March a state board is likely to deny the Yankee reactor licenses to operate or to create radioactive waste. If that happens, a Vermont shutdown could mark a critical moment in establishing state power over an atomic reactor. A critical domino would fall -- as it has in Japan and Europe -- and we will begin taking down old reactors all across the U.S. Four new reactors barely under construction will go down with them, **making inevitable the end** America's age of atomic power. In Vermont, the New Orleans-based Entergy bought the Yankee reactor in 2002. Entergy agreed to shut it if the state's Public Service Board denied it a Certificate of Public Good to continue to operate and generate radioactive waste. That decision is due by March 21, the forty-year anniversary of the reactor's 1972 opening. Entergy has horrified many of its staunchest Green Mountain supporters. One of its cooling towers has simply collapsed from ancient rot and basic negligence. It has leaked tritium and other radioactive isotopes from pipes the company has said -- under oath -- do not exist. Entergy sued Vermont after the legislature voted (26 to 4) to shut the reactor. When its lawyers won in federal court, Entergy demanded the public pay it $4 million in legal fees. But the company miscalculated. It welcomed Federal Judge Garvan Murtha's ruling that the legislature could not shut Yankee (the state is appealing). But Murtha also upheld the right of the Public Service Board to deny Entergy those operating and waste production permits. So after lauding the decision, Entergy's lawyers now want Murtha to change it. Entergy has also asked the Public Service Board for a stay in its expected denial of the permits. The case is clearly headed to the corporate-owned U.S. Supreme Court. But for Entergy to win, the Roberts majority would have to rule that the company was temporarily insane when signed its agreements with the state, and that a state agency can be forced (against its will) to issue reactor operating and waste creating permits. The history of U.S. courts denying states the right to shut reactors dates back to the 1954 Atomic Energy Act. But deferral to the federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission's bent for keeping rush-bucket reactors on line is rapidly eroding. The Commission granted Vermont Yankee a license extension one day before the Fukushima disaster. A state-mandated shut down could seriously impact the political calculus for an industry whose grassroots opposition **has become a full-on tsunami.** New York's Indian Point reactors are under assault from Governor Andrew Cuomo, whose father cut the 1988 deal that forced Long Island's Shoreham reactor to shut without ever achieving commercial operation. Cuomo is being pushed by a fierce grassroots anti-nuke groundswell. Entergy does need state permits that would let two remaining reactors at Indian Point (Unit One went down long ago) continue heating and irradiating the Hudson River. New York could demand Entergy build extremely expensive cooling towers,which may force it to shut down for economic reasons. Similar forces are at work in New Jersey and other states. In Florida, botched multi-billion dollar repairs to the Crystal River reactor near Tampa have forced a brutal grassroots battle over soaring electric rates which must be approved by increasingly beleaguered state regulators. It is highly likely that reactor will never operate again. At Pilgrim, Mass., is strongly intervening against a license extension. Both remaining reactors are currently shut at California's San Onofre (Unit One there also went down long ago), where grassroots activists -- including local surfers -- are in pitched battle against re-opening. Ohio's Davis-Besse is having its containment dome sliced for the fourth time. Two reactors in Nebraska are still recovering from major flooding. All across the country, dozens of rust-bucket nukes stagger on their last legs even as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission hands them extended licenses in the face of escalating state and local opposition. Once the firewall against recourse from the states is breached, a flood of shutdowns could well follow. In Japan, utilities must have permits from a host prefecture to re-open after refueling or repairs. Of 54 licensed reactors nationwide, only two now operate. Both could be shut soon, rendering Japan nuke-free for the first time in four decades. Germany has shut eight reactors and will take down 11 more by 2012. Except for Great Britain and a number of eastern holdouts, the "nuclear renaissance" has been all but abandoned in Europe, with an escalating cascade of elderly nukes going cold and proposed new projects being abandoned. The accelerating revolution in renewables has allowed solar, wind and other green sources to outstrip atomic reactors in cost, time to build, ecological impact and safety. As billions pour into Solartopian sources, private investment in atomic energy has all but disappeared -- **except where there are massive taxpayer subsidies**. **Even that's not enough.** In 2011, President Obama handed $8.33 billion in federal loan guarantees to the builders of two reactors at Georgia's Vogtle. But Peach State ratepayers are already being soaked for billions more in pre-payments, and the cost of the project is soaring. A parallel financial disaster looms at the Robinson site in neighboring South Carolina. Though the industry assumes these four reactors will eventually be finished, economic realities may say otherwise. Cost estimates for new nukes have been soaring even before construction begins. Even with federal money, the builders still demand that state ratepayers foot the bill as the process proceeds, meaning consumers are on the hook for multiple billions even if the reactors never open. Pitched battles over this Construction Work in Progress scam have already been won by consumers in Missouri and are being fought in Iowa and elsewhere. As the years of building drag on, costs will escalate while renewables continue to become cheaper. Sooner or later, construction is likely to stop, as it did at numerous projects in the 1970s and 1980s which were never finished. Today the Department of Energy still sits on some $10 billion in available guarantees without a recipient ready to build a new nuke. For the first time since early in the George W. Bush years, there has been no executive request for additional reactor construction loan guarantees. In Finland and Flamanville, France, new reactor projects are years behind schedule and billions over budget. With new construction virtually abandoned, and the continued operation of old reactors under intense attack in Japan, Europe and the U.S., only China and India remain as likely sites for large numbers of new nukes. Russia is doing its best to peddle them throughout the Third World. South Korea wants to sell reactors to the United Arab Emirates. But grassroots resistance in India has been fierce. China is still mulling a post-Fukushima decision on whether to proceed with reactors already under construction. Signs of a popular uprising against rampant pollution -- including nuclear reactors -- indicate growing public opposition. But here in the U.S., **we are at the fall-off-the-cliff moment** for atomic energy, new and old. Entergy, says Deb Katz of the Citizens Awareness Network, has been "blinded by its arrogance and contempt for the state of Vermont." The company, she says, "is attempting to establish that corporations are more powerful than the states they operate in." If the citizens of Vermont can shut Yankee, a dam will be breached and the post-Fukushima power of a rising grassroots tsunami will be made tangible. **Solartopia will be that much closer**. And the grassroots No Nukes campaign will begin to take its place as one of history's most successful popular movements. Let's just make sure these shut-downs happen before the **next Fukushima irradiates us all.**

**Reliance on evidence in debate teaches logical skills that are important in other areas of life**

**Speice and Lyle ‘03**

(Patrick, Wake Forest, and Jim, Debate Coach – Clarion, “Traditional Policy Debate: Now More Than Ever”, Debaters Research Guide, http://groups.wfu.edu/debate/MiscSites/DRGArticles/SpeiceLyle2003htm.htm)

The second set of academic skills that policy debate helps develop is logic skills. Debate teaches how to structure thoughts and argument. It teaches students how to structure thoughts about identifying and addressing problems. The structure of policy debates, and their reliance on evidence, teaches the significance of general argumentative concepts such as claims and warrants. The use of outlining in presenting and flowing arguments teaches students how to apply and understand the role of claims and warrants. Once debaters develop these skills they are better prepared to structure a speech or write an argumentative paper. They understand where to place specific arguments and use evidence within the overall structure of the argument being presented. While critique debating also teaches these concepts, there is a very different understanding, and use of, these concepts between the policy focused and non-policy focused debate camps. By not advocating an alternative, or failing to define the solvency components of the nebulous “rethink” policy (if it is a policy) or absolutist “vote neg” approach, this approach to the activity de-emphasizes the role of warrants in proving the validity of the claims, rendering these discussions shallow.

**Concrete action key to avoid the case impact and exploitation**

**Ling ‘01**

(LHM, Professor, The New School, New York, Post-Colonial International Relations: Conquest and Desire Between Asia and the West)

Without **concrete action** for change, postmodernism's `dissident voices' have remained bracketed, disconnected, not really real. In maintaining `a criti­cal distance' or `position offshore' from which to `see the possibility of change' (Shapiro, 1992: 49), the postmodern critic brushed off too conveniently the immediate cries of those who know they are **burning in the hells of exploitation**, racism, sexism, starvation, civil war, and the like but who have few means or strategies to deal with them. What hope do *they* have of overthrowing the shackles of sovereignty without a program of action? After all, asked Mark Neufeld, `What is political without partisanship?' (Neufeld, 1994: 31). In not answering these questions, postmodernists recycled, despite their avowals to the contrary, the same sovereign outcome as (neo)realism: that is, discourse divorced from prac­tice, analysis from policy, deconstruction from reconstruction, particulars from universals, and critical theory from problem-solving. Dissident international relations could not accommodate an interactive, articulating, self-generative Other. Its exclusive focus on the Western Self en­sured, instead, (neo)realism's sovereignty by relegating the Other to a familiar, subordinate identity: that is, as a mute, passive reflection of the West or utopian projection of the West's dissatisfaction with itself. Critique became romanti­cized into a totalizing affair - especially for those who must bear the brunt of its repercussions. bell hooks asked, appropriately: `[s]hould we not be suspicious of postmodern critiques of the "subject" when they surface at a historical moment when many subjugated people feel themselves coming to voice for the first time?' (hooks, 1990: 28). Without this recognition, postmodernists ended up marginalizing, silencing, and exiling precisely those who are `the greatest vic­tims of the West's essentialist conceits (the excolonials and neocolonials, Blacks, women, and so forth)' (Krishna, 1993: 405). Worse yet, added Roger Spegele, dissidence as offshore observation has `freed us from the recognition that we have a moral obligation to do anything about it' (Spegele, 1992: 174).

### PROLIF

**No impact read to prolif**

**Proliferation is slow and deters war- their impacts are irrational hype**

**DeGarmo ’11** [Denise DeGarmo, professor of international relations at Southern Illinois University, “Nuclear Proliferation Leads to Peace,” August, http://www.policymic.com/articles/nuclear-proliferation-leads-to-peace]

Obama’s declaration appeared momentous and it re-sparked debate on the issue of non-proliferation, but evidence suggests that rather than eliminating all nuclear weapons, nuclear proliferation brings about more peace. After Obama's speech, **non-proliferation organizations**, such as The Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, immediately launched a series of campaigns promoting nuclear disarmament. These groups **played upon the irrational fears of the public to gain support for their goals and objectives. As a result of their rhetoric, segments of the American population are convinced that more nuclear weapons across the globe will certainly lead to nuclear annihilation**. Nuclear proliferation will lead to the acquisition of this deadly technology by irrational and irresponsible states or worse yet, terrorists, who are less capable of self-control. Therefore, nuclear proliferation is not an option for a secure world. Unfortunately, **while the fear of proliferation is pervasive, it is unfounded and lacks an understanding of the evidence. Nuclear proliferation has been slow. From 1945 to 1970, only six countries acquired nuclear weapons**: United States, Russia, United Kingdom, France, China, and Israel. Since the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty came into effect in 1970, only three countries have joined the nuclear club: India, Pakistan, and North Korea. In total, only .05% of the world’s states have nuclear weapons in their possession. **Supporters of non-proliferation seem to overlook the fact that there are states currently capable of making nuclear weapons and have chosen not to construct them, which illustrates the seriousness with which states consider their entrance into the nuclear club**. Included on this list are such actors as: Japan, Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, Iran, South Korea, Taiwan, and South Africa. **The attraction of nuclear weapons is multifold. Nuclear weapons enhance the international status of states that possess them and help insecure states feel more secure**. States also seek nuclear capabilities for offensive purposes**. It is important to point out that** while nuclear weapons have spread very slowly, conventional weapons have proliferated exponentially across the globe. The wars of the 21st century are being fought in the peripheral regions of the globe that are undergoing conventional weapons proliferation. What the pundits of non-proliferation forget to mention are the many lessons that are learned from the nuclear world. **Nuclear weapons provide stability just as they did during the Cold War** era. The fear of Mutual Assured Destruction (**MAD**) **loomed heavily on the minds of nuclear powers** through out the Cold War and continues to be an important consideration for nuclear states today. **States do not strike first unless they are assured of a military victory, and the probability of a military victory is diminished by fear that their actions would prompt a swift retaliation by other states**. In other words, **states with nuclear weapons are deterred by another state’s second-strike capabilities**. During the Cold War, the United States and Soviet Union could not destroy enough of the other’s massive arsenal of nuclear weapons to make a retaliatory strike bearable. Even the prospect of a small number of nuclear weapons being placed in Cuba by the Soviets had a great deterrent effect on the United States. Nothing can be done with nuclear weapons other than to use them for deterrent purposes. **If deterrence works reliably, as it has done over the past 60 plus years, then there is less to be feared from nuclear proliferation than there is from convention warfare**. Despite Obama’s commitment to a nuclear free world, he seems to understand the importance of possessing nuclear weapons. His recommended budget for nuclear weapons spending in 2011 calls for a full 10% increase in nuclear weapons spending.

**Proliferating arsenals will be small- solves nuclear deterrence and de-escalates conflict**

**Forsyth ’12** [James Wood Forsyth Jr., PhD, currently serves as professor of national security studies, USAF School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. He earned his PhD at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver. He has written on great-power war, intervention, and nuclear issues, “The Common Sense of Small Nuclear Arsenals,” Summer, Strategic Studies Quarterly, http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2012/summer/forsyth.pdf]

Whatever its logical shortcomings, it is important to stress that **deterrence worked—it kept the Cold War “cold” and allowed international life to go on without a catastrophic nuclear war. After 70 years, most analysts agree on the basic dynamics of deterrence**, and the contemporary debate regarding deterrence, when not addressing the problem of nonstate actors, tends to pivot on force structure considerations. 19 Here, **the behavior of states with small nuclear arsenals is instructive**. As previously mentioned, **most states with nuclear arsenals have not acquired large numbers of nuclear weapons. Instead, they appear content with a relatively small arsenal capable of warding off an attack as well as dissuading others from interfering in their internal and external affairs**. But of the two roles nuclear weapons seem to play—deterrence and dissuasion—is one more important than another? For India and Pakistan, nuclear weapons play a decidedly deter­ rent role. But if one were to free Britain of its NATO obligations, who exactly would Britain be deterring today? What about France? Neither of these countries is as hard-pressed in the security arena as India or Pakistan, yet both hold on to nuclear weapons. While nuclear weapons still “hold power at bay,” one must wonder whose power is being held at bay and how. It is important not to overinterpret this. Nuclear weapons serve a purpose. How else can one explain why nine states have them, while others appear to want them? But what purpose do they serve, in general? To answer that question, one must look at what nuclear weapons do for states. Among other things, **nuclear weapons socialize leaders to the dangers of adventurism and, in effect, halt them from behaving or responding recklessly to provocation**. 20 Statesmen may not want to be part of an international system that constrains them, but that is the system that results among nuclear powers. Each is socialized to the capabilities of the other, and **the relationship that emerges is one tempered by caution despite the composition, goals, or desires of its leaders**. In short, **nuclear weapons deter and dissuade**.

**No risk of offense- 50 years of history proves no country wants to break the nuclear taboo**

**Shahid ’10** [Kamran, Master's in International Research and Contemporary Political Theory from the University of Westminster, London, professor of International Relations and news anchor of Frontline, “The benefits of having nuclear weapons,” June 16, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/21445/the-benefits-of-having-nuclear-weapons/>]

If the liberals and realists are in the quest for ‘order’ which can administrate cooperation and peace among states, and prevent the world from conflicts and wars, then one argues that it is **this ‘nuclear order’**, or nuclear defensive force, which **will be the central deterrent authority of the international system. In the presence of this ‘nuclear order’ no state can ‘cheat the international agreements’** **(the liberal explanation of wars) nor lust for ‘relative gains’ (realist justification of war).** **No state will even to think of destroying the security and territorial unity of a nuclear state. In the short span of 50 years the world has witnessed the gradual but transatlantic spread of nuclear weapons. States like Pakistan and Israel become more desperate to develop nuclear warheads** when they have to encounter much stronger enemies in their respective geographical locations. **By adopting the nuclear path both states have offset their conventional military weaknesses, made their defences invulnerable and transformed their inferiority to that of nuclear parity with their opponent. States do not acquire nuclear arsenals in order to annihilate their enemies**. On the other hand, **states are desperate to create a strong nuclear shield in order to avert wars by deterring ‘would-be’ aggressors once and for all**.

**CBW**

**A. Curbing nuclear prolif causes a shift to bioweapons**

**Zilinskas ’00** [Raymond A., Former Clinical Microbiologist and Dir. – Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Program – Center for Nonproliferation Studies of Monterey Institute of International Studies, in “Biological Warfare: Modern Offense and Defense,” Ed. Raymond A. Zilinskas, p. 1-2, Google Print]

It is an odd characteristic of biological weapons that military generals tend to view them with distaste, but civilian bioscientists often have lobbied for their development and deployment. There are, of course, understandable reasons for this oddity; generals find that these weapons do not fit neatly into tactical or strategic military doctrines of attack or defense, whereas researchers have observed that transforming microbes into weapons presents interesting scientific challenges whose solution governments have been willing to pay well for. Another oddity is that whenever biological weapons have been employed in battle, they have proven militarily ineffectual, yet bellicose national leaders persevere in seeking to acquire them. There is also a facile explanation for this anomaly, namely, that although pathogens are all too willing to invade prospective hosts, human ingenuity so far has failed to devise reliable methods for effectively conveying a large number of pathogens to the population targeted for annihilation by disease. This repeated failure has not deterred leaders; again and again they become allured by the potential destructive power of biological weapons. Perhaps trusting science too much, they direct government scientists to develop them, believing that this time a usable weapon of mass destruction will be achieved. Their belief so far has been thwarted, but is it possible that within the foreseeable future the potential of biological weapons will be realized and that the effect of a biological bomb, missile, or aerosolized cloud can be as readily predetermined as that of a bomb or missile carrying a conventional or nuclear warhead? There are many who believe that today's bioscientists and chemical engineers working in unison and wielding the techniques of molecule biology developed since the early 1970s could, if so commanded, develop militarily effective biological weapons within a fairly short time. If this supposition is correct, our perception of biological weapons as being undependable, uncontrollable, and unreliable must change. The reason is simple: if these weapons are demonstrated to possess properties that make it possible for commanders to effect controlled, confined mass destruction on command, all governments would be forced to construct defenses against them and some undoubtedly would be tempted to arm their military with these weapons that would be both powerful and relatively inexpensive to acquire. Ironically, **as tougher international controls are put into place to deter** nations from seeking to acquire chemical and **nuclear weapons, leaders may be even more drawn to biological arms as the most accessible form of weapon of mass destruction.** Before beginning a consideration of the implications of molecular biology for biological warfare (BW) and defense, it is worthwhile to briefly review the history of microbiology. It has passed through two eras, and we presently are in its third era. The first was the “pre-Pasteur” era; when the underlying science of fermentation was unknown, so microbiology was applied strictly on an empirical basis. Although undoubtedly any fine beers and wines, as well as breads and other fermented foods, were produced through the use of empirically developed fermentation techniques, no finely controlled production of chemicals was possible. During this era, BW was also empirically based. Common tactics included contaminating water sources with bloated animal carcasses and catapulting infected cadavers into citadels (Poupard and Miller, 1992).

**B. Bioweapons are the biggest risk of extinction- our author is the most qualified**

**Matheny ’07** [Jason, research associate with the Future of Humanity Institute at Oxford University, where his work focuses on technology forecasting and risk assessment - particularly of global catastrophic risks and existential risks.[1] He previously worked for the World Bank, the Center for Biosecurity, the Center for Global Development, and on national security projects for the US government. He is a Sommer Scholar and PhD candidate in Applied Economics at Johns Hopkins University. He holds an MPH from Johns Hopkins, an MBA from Duke University, and a BA from the University of Chicago, Department of Health Policy and Management, Bloomberg School of Public Health, Johns Hopkins University, “Reducing the Risk of Human Extinction,” http://www.physics.harvard.edu/~wilson/pmpmta/Mahoney\_extinction.pdf]

**Of current extinction risks, the most severe may be bioterrorism. The knowledge needed to engineer a virus is modest compared to that needed to build a nuclear weapon; the necessary equipment and materials are increasingly accessible and because biological agents are self-replicating, a weapon can have an exponential effect on a population** (Warrick, 2006; Williams, 2006). 5 **Current U.S. biodefense efforts are funded at $5 billion per year** to develop and stockpile new drugs and vaccines, monitor biological agents and emerging diseases, and strengthen the capacities of local health systems to respond to pandemics (Lam, Franco, & Shuler, 2006). **There is currently no independent body assessing the risks of high-energy physics experiments. Posner** (2004) **has recommended withdrawing federal support for such experiments because the beneﬁts do not seem to be worth the risks**.

### NATIVES

**. The Term ‘Native American’ is supportive of the government. The aff/neg teams use of this term supports the idea that they are prisoners of the state**

Gaffney 06. Dennis Gaffney, 2006, writer for The New York Times, Christian Science Monitor, and the Boston Globe. <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/roadshow/series/highlights/2006/bismarck/fts\_hour3\_4.html> accessed Oct 31 2007.

Moreover, a large number of Indians actually strongly object to the term *Native American* for political reasons. In his 1998 essay "I Am An American Indian, Not a Native American!", Russell Means, a Lakota activist and a founder of the American Indian Movement (AIM), stated unequivocally, "I abhor the term 'Native American.'" He continues: It is a generic government term used to describe all the indigenous prisoners of the United States. These are the American Samoans, the Micronesians, the Aleuts, the original Hawaiians, and the erroneously termed Eskimos, who are actually Upiks and Inupiaqs. And, of course, the American Indian.

**orrupt leaders will undermine the possibility for sovereignty and self-determination**

**Reynolds ‘4** [Jerry; “Lobbying scandal highlights peril of tribal feuds”; Indian Country Today; Nov 3, 2004. Vol. 24, Iss. 21;  pg. A1; ProQuest //nick]

"Fiscal mismanagement undermines sovereignty because ... [i]nadequately accounting for the Peoples' money will only deny them the opportunity to take action on important tribal priorities. **Corruption undermines sovereignty because it too wastes scarce financial resources and undermines the government's credibility.** Administrative dysfunction in tribal government has a corrosive effect on tribal sovereignty in other intangible ways. Notwithstanding the immediate effects of the many faces of mismanagement, if the **people have no faith in the manner in which government functions**, they will be unlikely to get involved in government affairs. **This is a disaster for self-determining capacity. If the most capable and generous people in the community feel that getting involved in government affairs is a waste of time, then the only people who will get involved will be either the least capable or the most selfish.** When that happens, **tribal government has been reduced to simply a game for a few self-interested players and its role as the defender of the peoples' sovereignty is lost."**

**Plans essentializes Native Americans – upholds colonialism**

**Bosworth,** B.A. in Environmental Studies from Macalester College, **2010** [Kai Anthony, “Straws in the Wind: Race, Nature and Technoscience in Postcolonial South Dakotan Wind Power Development”, http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1007&context=envi\_honors]

Chapter 5 takes a detailed look at public representations of Native Americans and wind power, including a guide to Native American wind development produced by the Department of Energy, videos examining the Rosebud efforts to build a wind turbine, and other web images and narratives. I argue that dominant images of the Ecological Indian fail to interrogate colonialism, while homogenizing Native American experience under essentializing and romantic notions of indigenous people as closer to nature.

**These reps normativize the Native destroying culture through the eradication of indigeneity**

**Bosworth,** B.A. in Environmental Studies from Macalester College, **2010** [Kai Anthony, “Straws in the Wind: Race, Nature and Technoscience in Postcolonial South Dakotan Wind Power Development”, http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1007&context=envi\_honors]

Discourses of Native Americans harmonizing with nature in opposition to modernity are part of American culture and history, and have grown to produce normative indigenous experiences and normative views of indigeneity both locally and worldwide. As Darren Ranco writes, “The use and abuse of the Ecological Indian is culture – intimately a part of the culture of recognition and justice in which contemporary Indians exist” (2007, 49). Thus historical and contemporary narratives of the Ecological

Indian produce intelligible articulations of indigeneity among the general public and among indigenous people themselves, who collectively and individually position themselves in relation to discourses of indigeneity (Li 2000). Thus the following representations of Lakota and collective Native American or indigenous identity are useful for the DOE in their circulation and intelligibility among both Native and non- Native individuals, institutions, and decision-makers.

#### Util is good

**Fried ’94** (Charles Fried “Rights and Wrongs as Absolute.” Absolutism and Its Consequentialist Critics. , p. 76. Ed. Haber 1994)

Even within such boundaries we can imagine extreme cases where killing an innocent person may save a whole nation. In such cases it seems fanatical to maintain the absoluteness of the judgment, to do right even if the heavens will in fact fall. And so the catastrophic may cause the absoluteness of right and wrong to yield, but even then it would be a non sequitur to argue (as consequentialists are fond of doing) that this proves that judgments of right and wrong are always a matter of degree, depending on the relative goods to be attained and harms to be avoided. I believe, on the contrary, that the concept of the catastrophic is a distinct concept just because it identifies the extreme situations in which the usual categories of judgment (including the category of right and wrong) no longer apply. At the other end of the spectrum, there is the concept of the trivial, the de minimis where the absolute categories do not yet apply. And the trivial also does not prove that right and wrong are really only a matter of degree. It is because of these complexities and because the term absolute is really only suggestive of a more complex structure, that I also refer to the norms of right and wrong not as absolute but as categorical.

**It’s the only moral code**

**Seeley, ‘86**

(Central Committee for Conscientious Objectors, The Handbook of Non-Violence, p. 269-70)

In moral reasoning prediction of consequences is nearly always impossible. One balances the risks of an action against its benefits; one also considers what known damage the action would do. Thus a surgeon in deciding whether to perform an operation weighs the known effects (the loss of some nerve function, for example) and risks (death) against the benefits, and weighs also the risks and benefits of not performing surgery. Morally, however**,** human extinction is unlike any other risk. No conceivable human good could be worth the extinction of the race, for in order to be a human good it must be experienced by human beings. Thus extinction is one result we dare not-may not-risk. Though not conclusively established, the risk of extinction is real enough to make nuclear war utterly impermissible **under any sane moral code.**

### Off case

**Natural gas is strong now, but continued focus is key**

**IEA 12**

**[International Energy Agency, “Golden Rules for a Golden Age of Gas”, World Energy Outlook Report on Unconventional Gas, 5-29-2012,** [**http://www.iea.org/media/WEO\_GoldenRules\_ForA\_GoldenAgeOfGas\_Flyer.pdf**](http://www.iea.org/media/WEO_GoldenRules_ForA_GoldenAgeOfGas_Flyer.pdf)**]**

Natural gas is poised to enter a golden age, but will do so only if a significant proportion of the world’s vast resources of unconventional gas – shale gas, tight gas and coalbed methane – can be developed profitably and in an environmentally acceptable manner. Advances in upstream technology have led to a surge in the production of unconventional gas in North America in recent years, holding out the prospect of further increases in production there and the emergence of a large-scale unconventional gas industry in other parts of the world, where sizeable resources are known to exist. The boost that this would give to gas supply would bring a number of benefits in the form of greater energy diversity and more secure supply in those countries that rely on imports to meet their gas needs, as well as global benefits in the form of reduced energy costs. Yet a bright future for unconventional gas is far from assured: numerous hurdles need to be overcome, not least the social and environmental concerns associated with its extraction. Producing unconventional gas is an intensive industrial process, generally imposing a larger environmental footprint than conventional gas development. More wells are often needed and techniques such as hydraulic fracturing are usually required to boost the flow of gas from the well. The scale of development can have major implications for local communities, land use and water resources. Serious hazards, including the potential for air pollution and for contamination of surface and groundwater, must be successfully addressed. Greenhouse-gas emissions must be minimised both at the point of production and throughout the entire natural gas supply chain. Improperly addressed, these concerns threaten to curb, if not halt, the development of unconventional resources. The technologies and know-how exist for unconventional gas to be produced in a way that satisfactorily meets these challenges, **but a continuous drive from governments and industry** to improve performance is required if public confidence is to be maintained or earned. The industry needs to commit to apply the highest practicable environmental and social standards at all stages of the development process. Governments need to devise appropriate regulatory regimes, based on sound science and high-quality data, with sufficient compliance staff and guaranteed public access to information. Although there is a range of other factors that will affect the development of unconventional gas resources, varying between different countries, our judgement is that there is a **critical link** between the way that governments and industry respond to these social and environmental challenges and the prospects for unconventional gas production.

#### Nuclear power trades off with natural gas investment—but only works with federal involvement

Yanosek 12

[Kassia Yanosek, GSB 2005, is an entrepreneur-in-residence at Stanford University’s Steyer-Taylor Center for Energy Policy and Finance. She also is a private equity investor in the energy sector as a principal at Quadrant Management and Founder of Tana Energy Capital LLC, “Financing Nuclear Power in the US”, Stanford Energy Journal, 2012, http://energyclub.stanford.edu/index.php/Journal/Financing\_Nuclear\_Power\_by\_Kassia\_Yanosek]

Nuclear energy has attractive qualities in comparison to other sources of electricity. A primary motivation to pursue the development of nuclear energy in the U.S. has been its low operating fuel costs compared with coal, oil, and gas-fired plants. Over the lifetime of a generating station, fuel makes up 78% of the total costs of a coal-fired plant. For a combined cycle gas-fired plant, the figure is 89%. According to the Nuclear Energy Institute, the costs for nuclear are approximately 14%, and include processing, enrichment, and fuel management/disposal costs. Today’s low natural gas prices have enhanced the prospects of gas-fired power, but utilities still remain cautious about over-investing in new natural gas generation given the historical volatility of prices. Furthermore, nuclear reactors provide baseload power at scale, which means that these plants produce continuous, reliable power to consistently meet demand. In contrast, renewable energies such as wind or solar are only available when the wind blows or the sun shines, and without storage, these are not suitable for large-scale use. Finally, nuclear energy produces no carbon emissions, which is an attractive attribute for utilities that foresee a carbon tax being imposed in the near future. Given nuclear’s benefits, one may wonder why no new nuclear units have been ordered since the 1970s. This hiatus is in great part due to nuclear’s high cost comparative to other alternatives, and its unique set of risks. As a result, financing nuclear has necessitated government involvement, as the cost of nuclear typically exceeds that of the cost of conventional generation technologies such as coal and natural gas fired generation on a levelized cost of energy (LCOE) basis. LCOE represents the present value of the total cost of building and operating a generating plant over its financial life, converted to equal annual payments and amortized over expected annual generation, and is used to compare across different power generation technologies. For both regulated utilities and independent power producers, nuclear is unattractive if the levelized cost exceeds that of other technologies, since state utility commissions direct regulated utilities to build new capacity using the technology with the lowest LCOE.

**Higher U.S. gas production solves Russian energy imperialism—gives alternatives to Europe**

**Baker Institute 11**

[James A. Baker Institute for Public Policy at Rice University, “Shale Gas and U.S. National Security”, Report #49, 10-2011, <http://www.bakerinstitute.org/publications/EF-pub-PolicyReport49.pdf>]

The dramatic lessening of Europe’s dependence on Russian gas will likely have considerable geopolitical implications in thwarting Russia’s ability to exercise an “energy” weapon or to unduly influence political outcomes on the Continent. European buyers will have ample alternatives to Russian supplies, thereby reducing Moscow’s political leverage. This outcome would also contribute positively to the balance of power between Russia and the EU, putting Europe in a stronger position to influence Russian foreign policy near Europe’s borders. To wit, Europe’s high dependence on Russian pipeline natural gas supplies made it difficult for certain European leaders to engage in diplomacy objecting to Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 200826 and weakened their support of the shaky election of pro-Western Ukrainian president Viktor Yushchenko, who was negatively targeted by Moscow for his anti-Russian stances. A more diverse energy supply for Europe enhances U.S. interests by buttressing Europe’s abilities to resist Russian interference in European affairs and help border states in the Balkans and Eastern Europe assert greater foreign policy independence from Moscow. U.S. coalitions with European nations are an important element to U.S. national security, including efforts to combat international terrorism and prevent humanitarian crises. An energy-independent Europe will be better positioned to join with the United States in global peacekeeping and other international initiatives that might not have the full support of Russia.

**Russian imperialism makes war with the U.S. inevitable**

**Blank ‘7** (Stephen Blank , Research Professor of National Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, “Russian Democracy, Revisited” Spring, <http://www.securityaffairs.org/issues/2007/12/blank.php>) Bankey

Gvosdev defends his brand of realism as a moral policy based on prudential calculations that seek to maximize benefits and minimize losses. In other words, while Russia is admittedly far from an ideal state, we can live with it as it is. But is this policy towards Russia realistic in Gvosdev’s own terms? In fact, Russia’s foreign policy is fundamentally adversarial to America and to Western interests and ideals. Moreover, thanks to Russia’s domestic political structure, not only will **this foreign policy** trend expand **if unchecked**, it **will** almost **certainly lead Russia into another war**. Russia’s conduct in 2006 serves as a microcosm of this problem. Last year, Russia gratuitously provoked international crises by threatening Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus and Georgia over energy. It showed neither the will nor the capacity to arrest or reverse proliferation in Iran or North Korea. It displayed its readiness to amputate Georgia by force and annex its former territories to Russia. It attempted to undermine the OSCE and block it from fulfilling its treaty-mandated functions of monitoring elections. It refused to negotiate seriously over energy and economics with the European Union. It recognized Hamas as a legitimate government, gave it aid, and sold it weapons. And it sold weapons to Iran, Venezuela, China and Syria, knowing full well that many of these arms will be transferred to terrorists. At home, meanwhile, Russian President Vladimir Putin is widening state control over ever more sectors of the economy, including defense, metals, and the automotive industry. Foreign equity investment in energy and many other fields is increasingly excluded from Russia in favor of Kremlin-dominated monopoly. Russia is even seeking to convert the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) into an oil and gas cartel that supports its own interests, rather than those of other producers. Possibly, the United States can abide such a Russia. But it is clear that America’s partners and allies, particularly those in Eastern Europe and the “post-Soviet space,” cannot long live with a government whose policies seem essentially driven by a **unilateralist quest for unchecked power**. Russia’s current objectives seem to be incompatible with any notion of world order based on the principles accepted by it and its partners in 1989-91. Russia evidently covets recognition as a great power or energy superpower free from all international constraints and obligations and answerable to nobody. As the political scientist Robert Legvold wrote back in 1997, Russia “craves status, not responsibility.”[1](http://www.securityaffairs.org/issues/2007/12/blank.php#footnotes) It should come as no surprise that this irresponsibility still characterizes Russian diplomacy. After all, it is the hallmark of the Russian autocracy which Putin has restored with a vengeance. Autocracy logically entails empire, an autarchic and patrimonial concept of the Russian state that is owned by the Tsar, controlled by his servitors, and which survives only by expansion. Just as autocracy means that the Tsar is not bound by or responsible to any domestic institution or principle, it also means that in foreign policy, Russia does not feel obligated to honor its own prior treaties and agreements. The struggle to get Moscow to adhere to the 1999 OSCE Summit accords it itself signed—as well as its conduct during the Russo-Ukrainian energy crisis of 2006—fully confirms that point; whatever else happened in both cases, Moscow broke its own contract with the OSCE and with Kyiv. These are far from anomalies. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov himself said not long ago that Russia refuses to be bound by foreign standards, or conform to them.[2](http://www.securityaffairs.org/issues/2007/12/blank.php#footnotes) He has also insisted that the West respect Russian interests in the CIS, but shows no reciprocal respect for the treaties Russia has signed and since violated. Nor does he say that Russia must respect the interests of CIS governments themselves.[3](http://www.securityaffairs.org/issues/2007/12/blank.php#footnotes) By doing so, Lavrov has confirmed the warnings of analysts like Dmitry Trenin of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, who caution that Russia does not want to *belong* to a larger institutional grouping.[4](http://www.securityaffairs.org/issues/2007/12/blank.php#footnotes) Under these conditions, as both Western and Russian firms are learning all too well, property rights are conditional—if not entirely absent. Property is the Tsar’s to control, and he or his agents grant rents to their subordinates in return for service, which tragically is generally inefficient, self- and rent-seeking, and utterly corrupt. Today, this formula is visible in Russia’s pervasive official corruption, widespread criminality, and the absence of any sense of national interests among the country’s new “boyar” class. Such a system also entails an autarchic economy hostile to foreign investment and influence. Democratic and civilian control of Russia’s multiple militaries likewise is absent, and critics of the regime or reformers are routinely killed or threatened by those forces. The most recent examples of this tragic phenomenon are the assassinations of former FSB agent Alexander Litvinenko and journalist Anna Politkovskaya, and the attempted poisoning of former Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar. Russian and Western observers both recognize that the Tsarist model is back, albeit with some Soviet accretions. And true to this model, the Kremlin today operates largely by fiat and fear. Much of Vladimir Putin’s popularity clearly derives from the state monopoly over a large swath of the national media, growing fear of the police among ordinary Russians, and the sense of prosperity provided by seven years of (largely energy-based) economic growth. Absent the official cult of personality and with a free media, undoubtedly things would be rather different. All of which is to say that it is clear that, while the United States must engage with Russia, America cannot simply accept these deformities as the necessary price for doing business with Moscow. It is not simply a matter of “lecturing” Russia, as its elites have accused Washington of doing for decades. Genuine realism requires an engagement with Russia that respects its interests but which tells the truth and responds to its numerous violations of international obligations. Such realism also requires understanding that the reversion to Russian autocracy is not merely a matter of Russia’s sovereign choice, as Putin’s ideologues pretend. It is a threat to all of Russia’s neighbors because it inherently involves a quest for empire, since Moscow understands its full sovereignty to be attainable only if that of its neighbors is diminished. It is deeply ironic that Russia can pursue such policies today largely because of the West. In order to maintain its empire, Russia must offer all kinds of hidden and overt subsidies in energy, weapons, or other forms of economic and political currency. It can only afford to do so by charging its European energy customers full market price, even as it refuses to do the same at home. Likewise, for all its benefits, U.S. funding for Cooperative Threat Reduction enables Russia to spend ever more on its armed forces, which it otherwise could not afford to do. By itself, Russia cannot pay for the rising outlays on its armed forces, its ambitious goals for re-equipping them and converting them into a power projection force beyond its borders, or their current, bloated size. Under the circumstances, a realistic Western policy cannot abandon the borderlands to Moscow. If it has reason to believe that it enjoys freedom of action there, Moscow will promptly extend its dysfunctional political system to those lands, either directly or indirectly. In either case, it will create security vacuums which are ripe for conflict and which threaten both its own and European security. Russia’s inability to quell the Chechen uprising despite twelve years of utterly brutal warfare illustrates this quite clearly. Indeed, both wars with Chechnya (in 1994 and again in 1999) were launched to secure the domestic base of first the Yeltsin and then the incoming Putin regimes.[5](http://www.securityaffairs.org/issues/2007/12/blank.php#footnotes) Since then, the fighting has engulfed the entire North Caucasus, putting Russia, thanks to its own misguided policies, at greater actual risk of terrorism. It is precisely to avoid Russian expansionism and support for rogue regimes and proliferation that it is necessary to press Russia to return to the spirit and letter of the treaties it has signed and which make up the constitutional basis of Europe’s and Eurasia’s legitimate order. We should not pressure Russia because it is insufficiently democratic, but rather because it has freely given its word to treaties and conventions that must be upheld if any kind of international order is to be preserved. Admittedly, this means that America must reorient its policies to stop seeking to extend or impose democracy. No matter how deeply held, the ideas of the current Administration enjoy no special legitimacy abroad, whereas international obligations do. Likewise, we must make clear that while the interests of the kleptocracy that passes for government in Russia are advanced by lawlessness and imperial predation, neither the interests of the Russian people nor the security of Eurasia is advanced by such policies. Quite the contrary; those policies entail long-term stagnation and war, not progress, peace, or security. Thus a realistic policy towards Russia necessarily means realigning the values which we promote. They should be those of international law and of enhanced security for both peoples and states, not untrammeled unilateralism or that might makes right. But such realism also means fearlessly proclaiming and acting upon the truth that Russian scholars themselves know and admit: Russia today remains a risk factor in world politics.[6](http://www.securityaffairs.org/issues/2007/12/blank.php#footnotes) This is largely because its domestic political arrangements oblige Moscow to pursue a unilateral and neo-imperial policy fundamentally antithetical to the security of Eurasian states, including its own. Accountability is an important virtue for all states, **but for Russia it is indispensable. Without it, the Kremlin could very well succumb to imperial temptation, at the cost of international catastrophe.**

**Escalates to global nuclear war**

**Yesin** 2007(Colonel General Vladimir Senior Vice President of the Russian Academy of the Problems of Security, Defense, and Law. “Will America Fight Russia?;”. Defense and Security, No 78. LN July 2007)

Yesin: Should the Russian-American war begin, it will inevitably deteriorate into the Third World War. **The U**nited **St**ates **is a NATO member and this** bloc **believes in collective security**. In fact, collective security is what it is about. Vladimirov: **This war will** inevitably **deteriorate into a nuclear conflict. Regardless of what weapons will be used in the first phase.**

# \*\*2NC

# NG

# Solvency

#### Only Renewables can solve climate quick enough -

Rees 11 (Don't believe the spin on thorium being a greener nuclear option

, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/jun/23/thorium-nuclear-uranium>, Eifon)

Proponents counter that the NNL paper fails to address the question of MSR technology, evidence of its bias towards an industry wedded to PWRs. Reliant on diverse uranium/plutonium revenue streams – fuel packages and fuel reprocessing, for example – the nuclear energy giants will never give thorium a fair hearing, they say. But even were its commercial viability established, given 2010's soaring greenhouse gas levels, thorium is one magic bullet that is years off target. Those who support renewables say they will have come so far in cost and efficiency terms by the time the technology is perfected and upscaled that thorium reactors will already be uneconomic. Indeed, if renewables had a fraction of nuclear's current subsidies they could already be light years ahead.

#### Warming causes extinction.

Tickell 8

(Oliver Climate Researcher) August 11 “On a planet 4C hotter, all we can prepare for is extinction”, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/aug/11/climatechange)

We need to get prepared for four degrees of global warming, Bob Watson told the Guardian last week. At first sight this looks like wise counsel from the climate science adviser to Defra. But the idea that we could adapt to a 4C rise is absurd and dangerous. Global warming on this scale would be a catastrophe that would mean, in the immortal words that Chief Seattle probably never spoke, "the end of living and the beginning of survival" for humankind. Or perhaps the beginning of our extinction. The collapse of the polar ice caps would become inevitable, bringing long-term sea level rises of 70-80 metres. All the world's coastal plains would be lost, complete with ports, cities, transport and industrial infrastructure, and much of the world's most productive farmland. The world's geography would be transformed much as it was at the end of the last ice age, when sea levels rose by about 120 metres to create the Channel, the North Sea and Cardigan Bay out of dry land. Weather would become extreme and unpredictable, with more frequent and severe droughts, floods and hurricanes. The Earth's carrying capacity would be hugely reduced. Billions would undoubtedly die. Watson's call was supported by the government's former chief scientific adviser, Sir David King, who warned that "if we get to a four-degree rise it is quite possible that we would begin to see a runaway increase". This is a remarkable understatement. The climate system is already experiencing significant feedbacks, notably the summer melting of the Arctic sea ice. The more the ice melts, the more sunshine is absorbed by the sea, and the more the Arctic warms. And as the Arctic warms, the release of billions of tonnes of methane – a greenhouse gas 70 times stronger than carbon dioxide over 20 years – captured under melting permafrost is already under way. To see how far this process could go, look 55.5m years to the Palaeocene-Eocene Thermal Maximum, when a global temperature increase of 6C coincided with the release of about 5,000 gigatonnes of carbon into the atmosphere, both as CO2 and as methane from bogs and seabed sediments. Lush subtropical forests grew in polar regions, and sea levels rose to 100m higher than today. It appears that an initial warming pulse triggered other warming processes. Many scientists warn that this historical event may be analogous to the present: the warming caused by human emissions could propel us towards a similar hothouse Earth.

# PROLIF

### CBW ! OV

#### Outweighs nuclear war- more useable and new tech advances answer their impact defense

**Ouagrham-Gormley ‘12** [Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley is Assistant Professor in the Biodefense Program at George Mason University, “Barriers to Bioweapons: Intangible Obstacles to Proliferation,” International Security Volume 36, Number 4, Spring 2012, Project Muse]

In 2008 the World at Risk, an influential report written by a bipartisan commission chartered by Congress to assess U.S. efforts in preventing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation and terrorism, predicted that a bioterrorism event would likely take place by 2013.4 Without downplaying the nuclear threat, the report concluded that a **bioweapons attack was more likely than a nuclear event given the availability of material, equipment, and know-how required to produce bioweapons. Since 2001 a number of scientific feats seem to illustrate the growing ease with which potentially harmful biomaterial** [End Page 81] **can be produced**. These include the inadvertent creation of a lethal mousepox virus by Australian scientists in 2001;5 the synthesis of the poliovirus in 2002 by a team of scientists at the State University of New York at Stonybrook;6 the construction in 2003 of a bacteriophage (phiX) using synthetic oligonucleotides by the Venter Institute, located in Rockville, Maryland; and the synthesis of the first self-replicating cell called Mycoplasma mycoides JCVI-syn1.0 in May 2010.7 Further pushing the scientific envelop, work begun in 2003 by the synthetic biology scientific community to produce standardized short pieces of DNA may promise a future in which biological agents can be assembled much like Lego pieces for various purposes; in addition, **synthetic DNA sequences are now commercially available, and the cost and time required to produce biomaterial have decreased sharply in recent years**. Finally, with the automation of various processes, **new technologies have the potential to simplify scientific work and reduce the need for skilled personnel**.8 With the rapid advances in the biological sciences, scholars and analysts have focused much of the debate about bioweapons proliferation and bioterrorism on whether terrorist groups could produce a biological weapon. The majority contend that although sophisticated mass-casualty weapons, particularly those using new engineered pathogens, are primarily the domain of states, **terrorist groups could develop less sophisticated weapons using classical agents and readily available resources**.9 **Given the speed of cutting-edge** [End Page 82] **technological development**, however, **experts warn that terrorist groups might soon be able to produce sophisticated biological weapons using novel agents**.10 In contrast, a minority group of experts argue that given the technical complexity of working with biological agents and maintaining their viability, terrorist groups are unlikely to develop bioweapons in the near term, unless they receive state support. These experts emphasize the unsuccessful attempts by terrorist groups to develop and use bioweapons, and note that the only successful bioterrorism case—the anthrax letters of 2001—involved a highly skilled scientist—Bruce Ivins—who worked within the sophisticated U.S. biodefense program. Following the revelations about Ivins, some experts have argued that a disgruntled "lone wolf" with biological expertise, rather than a terrorist group with no expertise, is more likely to produce a bioweapon in the future.11

### 1NC Deterrence

#### Israel disclosure solves nuclear war

Beres 7 – Professor of Political Science and International Law at Purdue University (Louis René, Spring, “Israel’s Uncertain Strategic Future,” PDF)

The rationale for Israeli nuclear disclosure does not lie in expressing the obvious; that Israel has the bomb. Instead, it lies in the informed understanding that nuclear weapons can serve the nation’s security in a number of ways, all of which may be of benefit depending on the extent to which certain aspects of these weapons and the associated strategies are disclosed. The pertinent form and extent of disclosure is vital to Israeli nuclear deterrence. To protect itself against enemy strikes, particularly those carrying existential costs, Israel needs to exploit every component of its nuclear arsenal. The success of Israel’s efforts will depend in largemeasure not only upon its chosen configuration of “counterforce” (hard-target) and “counter-value” (city-busting) operations, but also upon the extent towhich this configuration is known in advance by enemy states. Before an enemy is deterred from launching first-strikes against Israel or fromlaunching retaliatory attacks following an Israeli preemption, it may not be enough to simply “know” that Israel has the bomb. Potential enemies need to recognize that Israeli nuclear weapons are sufficiently invulnerable to attack and they are aimed at highvalue targets. In this context, the Final Report of Project Daniel recommends that “a recognizable retaliatory force should be fashioned with the capacity to destroy some 15 high-value targets scattered widely over pertinent enemy states in the Middle East.” This counter-value strategy means that Israel’s second-strike response to enemy aggressions involving certain biological or nuclear weapons would be unambiguously directed at enemy populations, not at enemy weapons or infrastructures. Itmay appear, at first glance, that Israeli targeting of enemy military installations and troop concentrations (counterforce targeting) would be both more compelling as a deterrent and also more humane. But it is entirely likely that a nuclear-armed enemy could conceivably regard any Israeli retaliatory destruction of its armed forces as “acceptable” in certain circumstances. Such an enemy may even conclude that the expected benefits of annihilating “the Zionist entity” outweigh any expected retaliatory harms to itsmilitary.Under such circumstances, Israel’s nuclear deterrent would fail, possibly with existential consequences.

#### Israeli disclosure solves war- deters would-be attackers

**Beres ’04** [L. Prof Poli Sci @ Purdue. “Israel and the Bomb” International Security, 2004. JSTOR]

What, then, are the plausible connections between a more openly declared nuclear capability and enemy-state perceptions of Israel’s nuclear deterrent? One such connection concerns the relation between disclosure and perceived vulnerability of Israeli nuclear forces from preemptive destruction. Another such connection concerns the relation between disclosure and the perceived capacity of Israel’s nuclear forces to penetrate the attacking state’s active defenses. To the extent that removing the bomb from the Israeli basement, or disclosure, would encourage enemy-state views of an Israeli nuclear force that is sufficiently invulnerable to first-strike attacks and/or is capable of piercing enemy active defense systems, disclosure could represent a rational and prudent option for Israel. The operational benefits of disclosure would accrue from deliberate flows of doctrinal information about such matters as dispersion, multiplication and hardening of nuclear systems and about some other technical features of certain nuclear weapons systems. Above all else, such carefully-controlled flows would serve to remove enemy doubts about Israel’s nuclear force capabilities, doubts which – if unchallenged – could undermine Israeli nuclear deterrence. Removing the bomb from Israel’s basement might also heighten enemy-state perceptions of Jerusalem’s willingness to make good on its nuclear retaliatory threats. For example, by releasing information about its nuclear weapons that identified distinctly “usable” forces, Israel could remove enemy doubts about Jerusalem’s nuclear resolve. Here, a prospective attacker, newly aware that Israel could retaliate without generating intolerably high levels of civilian harms (possibly because of enhanced radiation13 and/or sub-kiloton weapons), would be more likely, because of Israel’s disclosure, to believe Jerusalem’s nuclear threats.

### 1NC Nuclear war

#### Iran prolif prevents conflict escalation- comparatively outweighs and turns their impacts

Waltz 12 – Senior Research Scholar at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies and Adjunct Professor of Political Science at Columbia University (Kenneth N., 07/17, “Iran and the Bomb,” PDF)

In arguing that a nuclear-armed Iran would represent an unacceptable threat to the United States and its allies, Colin Kahl rejects my contention that states tend to become more cautious once they obtain nuclear weapons and claims that I minimize the potential threat of an emboldened Islamic Republic. He accuses me of misreading history and suggests that I overestimate the stability produced by nuclear deterrence. In fact, it is Kahl who misunderstands the historical record and who fails to grasp the ramifications of nuclear deterrence. In Kahl's view, new nuclear states do not necessarily behave as status quo powers and can instead be highly revisionist. Seeking a precedent, he highlights the fact that the Soviet Union encouraged North Korea to launch a potentially risky invasion of South Korea in 1950, shortly after the Soviets had tested their first nuclear bomb. But Kahl neglects to explain the context of that decision. Some time before, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson had publicly identified the United States' security commitments in Asia; defending South Korea was not among them. The United States had also signaled its lack of interest in protecting the South Koreans by declining to arm them with enough weapons to repel a Soviet-backed invasion by the North. The Soviet Union therefore had good reason to assume that the United States would not respond if the North Koreans attacked. In light of these facts, it is difficult to see Stalin's encouragement of the invasion as an example of bold, revisionist behavior. Contrary to Kahl's claims, the beginning of the Korean War hardly supplies evidence of Soviet nuclear adventurism, and therefore it should not be understood as a cautionary tale when considering the potential impact that possessing a nuclear arsenal would have on Iranian behavior. Kahl seems to accept that nuclear weapons create stability -- or a form of stability, at least. But he notes -- as do most scholars of nuclear matters, myself included -- that nuclear stability permits lower-level violence. Taking advantage of the protection that their atomic arsenals provide, nuclear-armed states can feel freer to make minor incursions, deploy terrorism, and engage in generally annoying behavior. But the question is how significant these disruptive behaviors are compared with the **peace and stability** that nuclear weapons produce. Kahl points to the example of Pakistan, whose nuclear weapons have probably increased its willingness to wage a low-intensity fight against India, which makes the subcontinent more prone to crises. As Kahl correctly argues, Pakistan's increased appetite for risk probably played a role in precipitating the so-called Kargil War between India and Pakistan in 1999. But the Kargil War was the fourth war fought by the two countries, and it paled in comparison to the three wars they fought before they both developed nuclear weapons. In fact, the Kargil conflict was a war only according to social scientists, who oddly define "war" as any conflict that results in 1,000 or more battlefield deaths. By historical standards, that casualty rate constitutes little more than a skirmish. Far from proving that new nuclear states are not swayed by the logic of deterrence, the Kargil War supports the proposition that nuclear weapons **prevent minor conflicts from becoming major wars**. Indeed, nuclear weapons are the only peace-promoting weapons that the world has ever known, and there is no reason to believe that things would be different if Iran acquired such arms. Kahl also frets that a nuclear-armed Iran would step up its support for terrorist groups. Terrorism is tragic for those whose lives it destroys and unnerving for countries that suffer from it. But the number of annual fatalities from international terrorism is vanishingly small compared with the casualties wrought by major wars. Of course, like Kahl, I would not welcome increased Iranian support for Hezbollah or an increased supply of more potent Iranian arms to Palestinian militants. And I, too, hope for a peaceful resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the disputes between Israel and its neighbors. But the last several decades have not offered much reason to believe those goals can be easily attained, and I would rather see the possibility of major war reduced through nuclear stability, even if the price is an increase in disruptive activities and low-level conflict. Just a few months ago in these pages, Kahl eloquently expressed his opposition to a proposed preventive strike on suspected Iranian nuclear facilities, warning that it could spark a regional war ("Not Time to Attack Iran," March/April 2012). I agree. But Kahl and I differ on what the United States can achieve in its showdown with the Islamic Republic. Kahl appears to believe that it is possible for the United States to forgo risky military action and still prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons through a combination of sanctions and diplomacy. I strongly doubt that. Short of using military force, it is difficult to imagine how Iran could be prevented from acquiring nuclear weapons if it is determined to do so. That outcome would produce a lamentable possible increase in terrorism and lower-level conflict. But the many benefits of regional stability would **far outweigh** the costs.

#### No risk of offense- Iran would only pursue a small, opaque arsenal which avoids destabilization and solves deterrence

**Kraig ’11** [Dr. Michael Ryan Kraig serves as an assistant professor of national security studies at the Air Command and Staff College. He earned his PhD in political science from the State University of New York at Buffalo with majors in international relations and US foreign policy and has served in several senior capacities with the Stanley Foundation, “US Policies toward Tehran: Redefining Counterproliferation for the Twenty-First Century,” Winter, <http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2011/winter/kraig.pdf>]

In the end, **Iran is likely to follow the path of a latent weapons power, purposefully not constructing an explicit, fully weaponized arsenal, but rather cultivating and maintaining a hedged nuclear weapons infrastructure, much like India did from 1958 to 1998 or like Northeast Asian powers such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan have done on and off at various times since the 1970s** (e.g., via some mix of enrichment, reprocessing, and missile capabilities). Again, as already shown, **this gray-area option historically has been the path most embraced by would-be proliferators who have felt themselves in dire security straits, from South Africa to South Asia to Northeast Asia, because it gives both the security benefit domestically and internationally of having a nuclear program without incurring the global opprobrium of clearly breaking the rules of the NPT**. 67 **Staying within the legal limits of the allowed enrichment of materials indefinitely could create an atmosphere of constructive ambiguity that would provide Iran with international deterrent value, nationalist ideological value** (in terms of revolutionary credentials at home and abroad), **and a general sense of safety from acute, existential security concerns harbored by the regime**. Finally, **nuclear opacity would guarantee the continued low of some important conventional weapons capabilities to Tehran from powers such as India, Russia, and China**.

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### O/V

#### Nuclear war exacerbates racism – evacuations force choices on which groups to save

**Katz and Osdoby 82** [Arthur M. Katz and Sima R. Osdoby, author of Life After Nuclear War and graduate student at Johns Hopkins respectively, Cato Institute, http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa009.html]

If evacuation were to result in a prolonged relocation, divisive social conflicts, as well as economic and social dislocation, would be likely. Under much more favorable conditions in Great Britain during World War II, relationships between evacuees and their hosts degenerated quickly under the influence of prolonged stress, uncertainty, substantial class and urban-rural differences, and inadequate social service resources. This experience was not unique. Japan and Germany in World War II, and even the Netherlands in peacetime, experienced these type of conflicts. Under a limited war scenario in the United States, to absorb the evacuated population the number of people living in a single house or apartment in the host areas would have to increase six times (from three people to eighteen). It is not hard to imagine the conflict and stress that type for crowding would create.[7] Thus these problems are likely to be much more intractable under the "limited" war scenarios because of insufficient social services and the massive numbers of people involved. In threatened but unaffected metropolitan areas, decisions about who will be evacuated and when could become politically explosive -- fraught with fears of one group or another becoming the expendable victims. This is not to mention the problem of deciding when and how to evacuate special populations -- prisoners, patients in acute and chronic care facilities, etc.

#### Nuclear War amplifies social tensions and creates violence- evacuation

**Katz 82[** Arthur M, PHD in Chemistry from University of Rochester and MS in Meteorology from MIT, Cambridge Massachusetts, Pg 73]

Ikte recognized the potential for conflict between rural and suburban populations and urban evacuees. He believed that despite rural resistance, the overwhelming numbers of evacuees would force a grudging sharing of goods. However, this may not be the case. Limited nuclear war is strongly biased by its very nature to create the potential for these conflicts. Moreover, the problem is likely to be exaggerated in the United States. If the central city population is evacuated to the suburban and rural areas, the racial composition of the population will change. Almost 25 percent of the population in the central cities of the 157 SMSAs discussed above is nonwhite, while only 6 percent of the suburban and rural population is nonwhite. Moreover, the income distribution is very different, with the inner cities generally being poorer. Thus a combination of class and racial conf1ict may exacerbate the social tensions that existed in a situation similar to England in World War II. This will be particularly true if the war remains unterminated for any substantial period of time. This type of emerging racial conflict arose in Japan at the end of World War II: "The Koreans, who have been imported for labor, are feared and suspected of plotting against the Japanese .... Rumors and recrimination regarding a scapegoat minority such as the Koreans rose especially sharply. Given the changing but still unstable state of relations between white and nonwhite, and rich and poor groups in the United States, a dangerous conflict-laden situation might emerge under the conditions of terror and stress. Add to this the normal urban-suburban rural lifestyle dichotomies, and there is the potential of extreme disruption, perhaps even more long-lasting and threatening to societal stability than the physical damage.

### Exted

#### PC key to get immigration compromise,

Hollander 1-21. [Catherine, reporter, "4 Ways Obama Could Boost Economy in His 2nd Term" National Journal -- www.nationaljournal.com/whitehouse/4-ways-obama-could-boost-economy-in-his-2nd-term-20130121]

3. Pass immigration reform. Obama has made clear that immigration reform is a top priority for his second term. A bipartisan group of senators has been working to draft a bill to overhaul the nation's immigration laws. The issue is teed up for the 113th Congress. On Sunday, top White House adviser David Plouffe said there was “no reason” immigration reform shouldn’t move through Congress this year. Still, passing legislation will be no easy feat. Republicans want to take up immigration initiatives piecemeal, while Obama is calling for comprehensive legislation.¶ If Congress can reach agreement on immigration policy, it could help the economy. “Comprehensive immigration reform that legalizes currently unauthorized immigrants and creates flexible legal limits on future immigration in the context of full labor rights would help American workers and the U.S. economy,” Raúl Hinojosa-Ojeda of the University of California-Los Angeles, wrote in the Cato Journal last winter. More recently, Kevin Hassett of the conservative American Enterprise Institute argued that a “vast expansion of legal immigration could feed the next economic boom.”

### Link

#### Extend --

#### Nuclear power costs political capital – risks, startup cost, and public safety

Trembath 2/4/11 (Alex, Policy Fellow in AEL’s New Energy Leaders Project, “Nuclear Power and the Future of Post-Partisan Energy Policy”) <http://leadenergy.org/2011/02/the-nuclear-option-in-a-post-partisan-approach-on-energy/>

If there is one field of the energy sector for which certainty of political will and government policy is essential, it is nuclear power. High up front costs for the private industry, extreme regulatory oversight and public wariness necessitate a committed government partner for private firms investing in nuclear technology. In a new [report](http://www.thirdway.org/publications/370) on the potential for a “nuclear renaissance,” Third Way references the failed cap-and-trade bill, delaying tactics in the House vis-a-vis EPA regulations on CO₂, and the recent election results to emphasize the difficult current political environment for advancing new nuclear policy. The report, “The Future of Nuclear Energy,” makes the case for political certainty:

### Fear of Nuclear War good

**Fear of war prevents nuclear war from actually being started.**

**Futterman '94** Dr. J. A. H. Futterman, tech at Lawrence Livermore National Lab, "Meditations on the Morality of Nuclear Weapons Work, Obscenity and Peace, 1994, http://www.dogchurch.org/scriptorium/nuke.html

But the inhibitory effect of reliable nuclear weapons goes deeper than Shirer's deterrence of adventurer-conquerors. It changes the way we think individually and culturally, preparing us for a future we cannot now imagine. Jungian psychiatrist Anthony J. Stevens states, [15] "History would indicate that people cannot rise above their narrow sectarian concerns without some overwhelming paroxysm. It took the War of Independence and the Civil War to forge the United States, World War I to create the League of Nations, World War II to create the United Nations Organization and the European Economic Community. Only catastrophe, it seems, forces people to take the wider view. Or what about fear? Can the horror which we all experience when we contemplate the possibility of nuclear extinction mobilize in us sufficient libidinal energy to resist the archetypes of war? Certainly, the moment we become blasé about the possibility of holocaust we are lost. As long as horror of nuclear exchange remains uppermost we can recognize that nothing is worth it. War becomes the impossible option. Perhaps horror, the experience of horror, the consciousness of horror, is our only hope. Perhaps horror alone will enable us to overcome the otherwise invincible attraction of war." Thus I also continue engaging in nuclear weapons work to help fire that world-historical warning shot I mentioned above, namely, that as our beneficial technologies become more powerful, so will our weapons technologies, unless genuine peace precludes it. We must build a future more peaceful than our past, if we are to have a future at all, with or without nuclear weapons — a fact we had better learn before worse things than nuclear weapons are invented. If you're a philosopher, this means that I regard the nature of humankind as mutable rather than fixed, but that I think most people welcome change in their personalities and cultures with all the enthusiasm that they welcome death — thus, the fear of nuclear annihilation of ourselves and all our values may be what we require in order to become peaceful enough to survive our future technological breakthroughs.[16]

**Threat construction is good – it allows us to anticipate and prevent danger   
Berke 98** - Joseph Berke, Found. And Dir. Arbours Crisis Centre, 1998, Even Paranoids Have Enemies, p. 5-6

Internal and external persecution come together in the theoretical model of ‘the paranoid process’ – a set of developmental and defensive mechanisms which serve to delineate the individual’s inner psychic world and his experience of his emerging self, while, at the same time, contributing to the shaping of his sense of significant objects in his experiential world (Meissner 1986). One of this model’s core components, ‘the paranoid construction’ refers to a cognitive reorganization taking place in an attempt to sustain a comfortable sense of self which, however, may be at the expense of reality testing. This process, in its extreme form, leads to the formation of a persecutory bond, where a link is established between, on the one hand, the paranoid individual and, on the other, his persecutors and the terrifying forces that threaten to engulf him. This can become a rigid construction that reinforces the spiral of paranoia-persecution-paranoia. Meissner understands this mechanism as offering a sense of cohesion and durability to a fragile self, though it often involves a high degree of pathology and victimization. Instances of this process abound in individuals, institutions, and groups (including whole nations) where views of internal and external situations are (ab)used to service a brittle sense of identity. Fully recognizing this predicament, and the dangers involved, requires thinking about and tolerating our own conflictual parts. Paradoxically, a certain degree of paranoia is desirable as it is a basis for discrimination (Segal 1994); when we let a new experience touch us, we acknowledge that it may be bad or good, which enables us to anticipate danger. In leaders of an organization, for instance, a certain degree of paranoid potential can be a useful resource, as opposed to a dangerous naivety that would prevent the leader

### Fiction

**Concrete action key to avoid the case impact and exploitation**

**Ling ‘01**

(LHM, Professor, The New School, New York, Post-Colonial International Relations: Conquest and Desire Between Asia and the West)

Without **concrete action** for change, postmodernism's `dissident voices' have remained bracketed, disconnected, not really real. In maintaining `a criti­cal distance' or `position offshore' from which to `see the possibility of change' (Shapiro, 1992: 49), the postmodern critic brushed off too conveniently the immediate cries of those who know they are **burning in the hells of exploitation**, racism, sexism, starvation, civil war, and the like but who have few means or strategies to deal with them. What hope do *they* have of overthrowing the shackles of sovereignty without a program of action? After all, asked Mark Neufeld, `What is political without partisanship?' (Neufeld, 1994: 31). In not answering these questions, postmodernists recycled, despite their avowals to the contrary, the same sovereign outcome as (neo)realism: that is, discourse divorced from prac­tice, analysis from policy, deconstruction from reconstruction, particulars from universals, and critical theory from problem-solving. Dissident international relations could not accommodate an interactive, articulating, self-generative Other. Its exclusive focus on the Western Self en­sured, instead, (neo)realism's sovereignty by relegating the Other to a familiar, subordinate identity: that is, as a mute, passive reflection of the West or utopian projection of the West's dissatisfaction with itself. Critique became romanti­cized into a totalizing affair - especially for those who must bear the brunt of its repercussions. bell hooks asked, appropriately: `[s]hould we not be suspicious of postmodern critiques of the "subject" when they surface at a historical moment when many subjugated people feel themselves coming to voice for the first time?' (hooks, 1990: 28). Without this recognition, postmodernists ended up marginalizing, silencing, and exiling precisely those who are `the greatest vic­tims of the West's essentialist conceits (the excolonials and neocolonials, Blacks, women, and so forth)' (Krishna, 1993: 405). Worse yet, added Roger Spegele, dissidence as offshore observation has `freed us from the recognition that we have a moral obligation to do anything about it' (Spegele, 1992: 174).

### Util

**Fried and Seely evidence – you only die once – preresuqiest to being ablke to solve for sovergnty right**

**Utilitarianism is the only way to access morality. Sacrifice in the name of preserving rights destroys any hope of future generations attaining other values.   
Nye, 86 (Joseph S. 1986; Phd Political Science Harvard. University; Served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; “Nuclear Ethics” pg. 45-46) GZ**

Is there any end that could justify a nuclear war that threatens the survival of the species? Is not all-out nuclear war just as self contradictory in the real world as pacifism is accused of being? Some people argue that "we are required to undergo gross injustice that will break many souls sooner than ourselves be the authors of mass murder."73 Still others say that "when a person makes survival the highest value, he has declared that there is nothing he will not betray. But for a civilization to sacrifice itself makes no sense since there are not survivors to give meaning to the sacrifical [sic] act. In that case, survival may be worth betrayal." Is it possible to avoid the "moral calamity of a policy like unilateral disarmament that forces us to choose between being dead or red (while increasing the chances of both)"?74 How one judges the issue of ends can be affected by how one poses the questions. If one asks "what is worth a billion lives (or the survival of the species)," it is natural to resist contemplating a positive answer. But suppose one asks, "is it possible to imagine any threat to our civilization and values that would justify raising the threat to a billion lives from one in ten thousand to one in a thousand for a specific period?" Then there are several plausible answers, including a democratic way of life and cherished freedoms that give meaning to life beyond mere survival. When we pursue several values simultaneously, we face the fact that they often conflict and that we face difficult tradeoffs. If we make one value absolute in priority, we are likely to get that value and little else. Survival is a necessary condition for the enjoyment of other values, but that does not make it sufficient. Logical priority does not make it an absolute value. Few people act as though survival were an absolute value in their personal lives, or they would never enter an automobile. We can give survival of the species a very high priority without giving it the paralyzing status of an absolute value. Some degree of risk is unavoidable if individuals or societies are to avoid paralysis and enhance the quality of life beyond mere survival. The degree of that risk is a justifiable topic of both prudential and moral reasoning.

**Util is a d-rule**

**Gooden, 1995 (**Robert, philsopher at the Research School of the Social Sciences, Utilitarianism as Public Philosophy. P. 62-63) SAS

Consider, first, the argument from necessity. Public officials are obliged to make their choices under uncertainty, and uncertainty of a very special sort at that. All choices—public and private alike—are made under some degree of uncertainty, of course. But in the nature of things, private individuals will usually have more complete information on the peculiarities of their own circumstances and on the ramifications that alternative possible choices might have on them. Public officials, in contrast, are relatively poorly informed as to the effects that their choices will have on individuals, one by one. What they typically do know are generalities: averages and aggregates. They know what will happen most often to most people as a result of their various possible choices. But that is all. That is enough to allow public policy-makers to use the utilitarian calculus—if they want to use it at all—to choose general rules of conduct. Knowing aggregates and averages, they can proceed to calculate the utility payoffs from adopting each alternative possible general rules.

**Utilitarianism inevitable even in deontological frameworks**

**Green, 02** – Assistant Professor Department of Psychology Harvard University (Joshua, November 2002 "The Terrible, Horrible, No Good, Very Bad Truth About Morality And What To Do About It", 314)

Some people who talk of balancing rights may think there is an algorithm for deciding which rights take priority over which. If that’s what we mean by 302 “balancing rights,” then we are wise to shun this sort of talk. Attempting to solve moral problems using a complex deontological algorithm is dogmatism at its most esoteric, but dogmatism all the same. However, it’s likely that when some people talk about “balancing competing rights and obligations” they are already thinking like consequentialists in spite of their use of deontological language. Once again, what deontological language does best is express the thoughts of people struck by strong, emotional moral intuitions: “It doesn’t matter that you can save five people by pushing him to his death. To do this would be a violation of his rights!”19 That is why angry protesters say things like, “Animals Have Rights, Too!” rather than, “Animal Testing: The Harms Outweigh the Benefits!” Once again, rights talk captures the apparent clarity of the issue and absoluteness of the answer. But sometimes rights talk persists long after the sense of clarity and absoluteness has faded. One thinks, for example, of the thousands of children whose lives are saved by drugs that were tested on animals and the “rights” of those children. One finds oneself balancing the “rights” on both sides by asking how many rabbit lives one is willing to sacrifice in order to save one human life, and so on, and at the end of the day one’s underlying thought is as thoroughly consequentialist as can be, despite the deontological gloss. And what’s wrong with that? Nothing, except for the fact that the deontological gloss adds nothing and furthers the myth that there really are “rights,” etc. Best to drop it. When deontological talk gets sophisticated, the thought it represents is either dogmatic in an esoteric sort of way or covertly consequentialist.